With the strong possibility that we are no more than hours away from the test of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile by North Korea it is time that we consider our present options in dealing with the strange Korean communist monarchy. The sad reality, as we face a nearly unprecedented crisis, is that those options are more limited than most of us would like.

A small-scale, surgical strike involving precision weapons is out of the question as there are far too many targets to hit in too short a time for such a strike to be possibly successful. The consequences of a strike which was only partially successful are almost too awful to contemplate. For similar reasons, the possibility of a coup or assassination attempt (at least one not in concert with other measures) is similarly foreclosed. Also off the table is the option of some sort of total economic blockade (which would be unenforceable without Chinese, Russian, and South Korean assistance in any case). The ultimate option – a pre-emptive war to overthrow the North Korean regime – would be impossible without South Korea’s consent and participation, a development so unlikely as to be virtually unthinkable.

So, you may ask, what roads are open? There are several, each with their own virtues and pitfalls.

One option is to basically do nothing, (other than perhaps attempting to negotiate here and there in a less-than-serious way) hope that nature eventually takes its course on Kim Jong Il, and hope that his successor is more reasonable. This, I think, is the basic approach that has been adopted by the Bush Administration. The downside to this, of course, is that it leaves the basic problem of a nuclear North Korea in place.

The second option is to seriously negotiate with the North Koreans, as Clinton did in 1994, by offering serious incentives for them to abandon their nuclear weapons. The problem here, of course, is that by negotiating the United States would be rewarding North Korea’s behaviour and – more to the point – the North Koreans simply could not be trusted to abide by the terms of any deal reached.

The third and, as I see it, best option is for a massive strike against North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile facilities – along with other selected military installations. Such an attack would have to be much larger than a few dozen cruise missiles against Yongbyong and a few other sites.

Why, some may ask, is a large attack necessary? Why can’t the United States just hit a few nuclear sites and be done with it? Well, there are several reasons.

First – the North Koreans have had nuclear weapons for a number of years now (perhaps stretching back even into the 1990’s). It is certain that they have dispersed them across the country. In addition to hitting the nuclear sites themselves, it will be necessary to hit any site which contains nuclear-capable missiles or planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

The concern here isn’t so much of a strike against the United States. North Korea’s ICBM’s and other long-range missiles are all liquid-fuelled. They’re extremely vulnerable targets and, in any case, can probably be shot down by American interceptor missiles.

Intermediate range missiles are more of a problem. The North Koreans have a lot of them and they can be used to strike Japan or US installations in the Pacific. Even so, between strikes against bases and missile defences, they are probably a manageable problem as well.

However, while the intercontinental and intermediate range missiles could probably be dealt with by a limited strike, there’s another problem which could not be: the massive artillery barrage that they North Koreans could deliver against Seoul. With all of the artillery pieces they have within range of that city, the DPRK doesn’t need nukes to kill a million people.

Thus, any strike on North Korea is going to require striking North Korean artillery positions along the DMZ on a massive scale.

Therefore, we are left with truly staggering requirements for a strike. An attack will have to hit missile sites, air bases, NBC installations, and artillery sites. And, in order to be effective (and to prevent the North Koreans from getting off a shot) the strikes will have to be simultaneous.

So, what is to be done? There is only one way to pull off the sort of strike I’ve outlined above: to use nuclear weapons.

Any conventional attack is likely to result in millions of friendly deaths when the North Koreans get off a few shots – or, in the case of the artillery pointed as Seoul, millions. Only nuclear weapons offer the power to truly take out all of the targets in a rapid fashion.

In any case, I note that it is regarded as desirable to use nuclear weapons against certain installations (deeply buried bunkers and nuclear-biological-chemical facilities) and that, as I’ve pointed out in the past, there is probably little to distinguish the domestic and international political consequences of using one nuclear bomb from those of using fifty.

Such an attack would also be useful in that it would send a very positive message to Iran.

By no means should this be taken as a statement that I desire nuclear war. Quite the contrary – I desire to prevent it. More specifically, I desire to prevent it from being waged against myself or my relatives in Japan.

It should not have come to this. A strike against North Korea in 1994 would have been clean and quick. But, once Clinton and Carter struck their deal with the North Koreans – once they got their hands on their first nuclear bombs – they made this day all but inevitable.
To allow the existence of a nuclear North Korea armed with ICBM’s is an intolerable threat. It must be dealt with. If nuclear weapons are required to end that threat, then God wills it.Nuke North Korea

With the strong possibility that we are no more than hours away from the test of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile by North Korea it is time that we consider our present options in dealing with the strange Korean communist monarchy. The sad reality, as we face a nearly unprecedented crisis, is that those options are more limited than most of us would like.

A small-scale, surgical strike involving precision weapons is out of the question as there are far too many targets to hit in too short a time for such a strike to be possibly successful. The consequences of a strike which was only partially successful are almost too awful to contemplate. For similar reasons, the possibility of a coup or assassination attempt (at least one not in concert with other measures) is similarly foreclosed. Also off the table is the option of some sort of total economic blockade (which would be unenforceable without Chinese, Russian, and South Korean assistance in any case). The ultimate option – a pre-emptive war to overthrow the North Korean regime – would be impossible without South Korea’s consent and participation, a development so unlikely as to be virtually unthinkable.

So, you may ask, what roads are open? There are several, each with their own virtues and pitfalls.

One option is to basically do nothing, (other than perhaps attempting to negotiate here and there in a less-than-serious way) hope that nature eventually takes its course on Kim Jong Il, and hope that his successor is more reasonable. This, I think, is the basic approach that has been adopted by the Bush Administration. The downside to this, of course, is that it leaves the basic problem of a nuclear North Korea in place.

The second option is to seriously negotiate with the North Koreans, as Clinton did in 1994, by offering serious incentives for them to abandon their nuclear weapons. The problem here, of course, is that by negotiating the United States would be rewarding North Korea’s behaviour and – more to the point – the North Koreans simply could not be trusted to abide by the terms of any deal reached.

The third and, as I see it, best option is for a massive strike against North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile facilities – along with other selected military installations. Such an attack would have to be much larger than a few dozen cruise missiles against Yongbyong and a few other sites.

Why, some may ask, is a large attack necessary? Why can’t the United States just hit a few nuclear sites and be done with it? Well, there are several reasons.

First – the North Koreans have had nuclear weapons for a number of years now (perhaps stretching back even into the 1990’s). It is certain that they have dispersed them across the country. In addition to hitting the nuclear sites themselves, it will be necessary to hit any site which contains nuclear-capable missiles or planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

The concern here isn’t so much of a strike against the United States. North Korea’s ICBM’s and other long-range missiles are all liquid-fuelled. They’re extremely vulnerable targets and, in any case, can probably be shot down by American interceptor missiles.

Intermediate range missiles are more of a problem. The North Koreans have a lot of them and they can be used to strike Japan or US installations in the Pacific. Even so, between strikes against bases and missile defences, they are probably a manageable problem as well.

However, while the intercontinental and intermediate range missiles could probably be dealt with by a limited strike, there’s another problem which could not be: the massive artillery barrage that they North Koreans could deliver against Seoul. With all of the artillery pieces they have within range of that city, the DPRK doesn’t need nukes to kill a million people.

Thus, any strike on North Korea is going to require striking North Korean artillery positions along the DMZ on a massive scale.

Therefore, we are left with truly staggering requirements for a strike. An attack will have to hit missile sites, air bases, NBC installations, and artillery sites. And, in order to be effective (and to prevent the North Koreans from getting off a shot) the strikes will have to be simultaneous.

So, what is to be done? There is only one way to pull off the sort of strike I’ve outlined above: to use nuclear weapons.

Any conventional attack is likely to result in millions of friendly deaths when the North Koreans get off a few shots – or, in the case of the artillery pointed as Seoul, millions. Only nuclear weapons offer the power to truly take out all of the targets in a rapid fashion.

In any case, I note that it is regarded as desirable to use nuclear weapons against certain installations (deeply buried bunkers and nuclear-biological-chemical facilities) and that, as I’ve pointed out in the past, there is probably little to distinguish the domestic and international political consequences of using one nuclear bomb from those of using fifty.

Such an attack would also be useful in that it would send a very positive message to Iran.

By no means should this be taken as a statement that I desire nuclear war. Quite the contrary – I desire to prevent it. More specifically, I desire to prevent it from being waged against myself or my relatives in Japan.

It should not have come to this. A strike against North Korea in 1994 would have been clean and quick. But, once Clinton and Carter struck their deal with the North Koreans – once they got their hands on their first nuclear bombs – they made this day all but inevitable.
To allow the existence of a nuclear North Korea armed with ICBM’s is an intolerable threat. It must be dealt with. If nuclear weapons are required to end that threat, then God wills it.