It strikes me as notable that, in nearly fifty years of Democratic control of the House of Representatives (1947-1995) Democrats only had two major bursts of liberal activism, one in the early years of the Johnson Administration and another with the election of 1974’s “Watergate Congress.” That isn’t to say, of course, that the Democrats didn’t get anything done during the rest of the time, but it is to say that they didn’t do very much memorable. Certainly, they didn’t enact a good deal of their platform most of the rest of the time.

Running Congress is mostly a matter of simply managing day-to-day events. Real activity is only possible under certain specific conditions which, in essence, are either a national crisis or a smashing election which delivers one party a supermajority. The reason for this is simple: more often than not, on many issues, the titular majority is not the effective majority. That is to say, on an issue to issue basis, the majority party often does not command the loyalty of a majority of the Congress.

During Democratic days, this was the result of a coalition between conservative Democrats and Republicans. Today that coalition is between liberal Republicans and the Democrats. Let’s face it: Bill Frist may be the Majority Leader and Ted Stevens may sit in the President Pro Tempore’s Chair, but it would be a silly and gross exaggeration to claim that the Republicans really control the Senate when they get up in the morning. In reality, control of the Senate is being contested on a continual basis as the loyalties of the disloyal Republicans (Chafee, McCain, Snowe, and Collins most prominent among them) are tested.

Frankly, this is a natural outgrowth of being in the majority. When you’re in the minority, you can (as much of the Democratic Party now is) be dedicated to ideological purity. You can demand total loyalty on the issues because, frankly, what does it matter if you lose one Senator? You’re not in the majority anyways. More to the point, most self-proclaimed “moderates” tend to be oversized weathervanes and always on the move. If you’re in the majority, you can be guaranteed that you’re party will soon be filled with trimmers and opportunists.

It doesn’t take a genius to see what’s happened: we’re basically in the same situation, in terms of party alignment, as we were in the early 1960’s, only with the party labels reversed. The Republicans are the big-tent party, with a certain ideological tilt, but with an overriding commitment to remaining in government. The Democrats are the minority party, increasingly fearful of becoming a permanent minority, with an increasingly ideological base and an establishment which, while it’s willing to pander to that base, fears that it will soon be conquered by it.

There’s still some real hope for those who’d like to see the Republican agenda advanced. It’s not just over the horizon in 2006, but three and a half years away in November of 2008.

Hillary Clinton is running for President with a plan to move to the center, relying upon the anger of partisan Democrats to permit her to do this. I don’t think that they’re going to do it. Instead, I think that the Democratic base is going to demand an ultra-liberal candidate in 2008. They’re in the mood for a Democratic Goldwater, and they’re going to get one.

Republicans, on the other hand, are increasingly pragmatic. Though I’d personally prefer to have a conservative like Jeb Bush for President, I think that the GOP will go with a “moderate”. If I had to pick out three potential front runners for the Republican nomination in 2008, I’d pick Rudy Giuliani, John McCain, and Mitt Romney. Any of the three, paired up with a strong conservative (Rick Santorum, Sam Brownback, and Tim Pawlenty all seem like possible picks) would be a nearly unbeatable candidate.

In fact, I’d argue that a popular moderate Republican President might be the best thing which could possibly happen for conservative Republicans, especially Giuliani or McCain. Let’s explore the scenario for a minute.

Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that 2006 is a wash. And that, in 2008, we end up with McCain-Brownback versus, say, Dean-Feingold or something like that, with the latter running on a far-left platform. Not only does McCain win in a walk, but he carries with him a massive Congressional contingent. One which doesn’t quite share all of his views.

Here’s the thing: even the professed platforms of most moderate Republicans (and certainly that of John McCain) are far to the right of what’s actually coming out of Washington. Paradoxically, electing an Eisenhower Republican as President could give the Congress a short at bringing in some truly conservative reforms.

Of course, it could all end in tears also. That’s the risk that we take.

But that’s what we who seek truly conservative reforms must do: we’ve got to look to deliver a short-term blow to the enemy of such force that it gives us time to execute a program of real reform. We can’t do it in a Congress where, for all of our titles, we lack the effective control to actually govern on our own.

It’s worth remembering, most of the things that an important Congress does in a burst never get undone. Republicans have yet to dismantle most of the Great Society. Democrats never really undid the things that the post-war Republican Congress did. The GOP didn’t undo most of the New Deal. Etc.